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 Fighting a War Without Rifles: Deconstructing the Image of the Unflappable 
Medic  
Robert Del Toro 
 
“Medic!” is a word that every soldier learns shortly after being introduced to combat, a 
word to many that means help is on the way, but for some it is one of the last words they hear.  
On the battlefields of the Second World War, seconds determined if an infantryman was going to 
live or die; this reality made the medic one of the most valued members of the unit. The US 
Army Medical Department oversaw taking care of these wounded men, and the medics were 
their front-line treatment solution.1 The job of the medic has long been respected amongst the 
infantry, and the myth of the medic has long been a part of Second World War studies. 
At the end of the First World War, the US Army Medical Department realized that due to 
the nature of modern warfare and weaponry, treatment would need to be carried out as soon as 
possible. When examining how to improve treatment protocols, it was decided that members of 
the Medical Department would be attached to combat units during the interwar years.2 After this 
decision, personnel from the Medical Department began to serve alongside infantry and armored 
personnel as they entered a combat zone, rather than waiting in the rear for casualties. The 
newly-embedded soldiers from the Medical Department were quickly held to a high standard. In 
1945, the General Board, a review board of US Army officers, drafted the report The Evacuation 
of Human Casualties in the European Theater of Operation, in which they discussed the roles of 
the company aid man.3 When creating the report, the General Board relied heavily on the 
frontline infantry divisions’ reports in evaluating the effectiveness of the medic.4 From these 
reports, an image of the medic emerges. The General Board learned that “a qualified aid man is 
held in the highest esteem by the combat soldier and is usually the most popular man in the 
platoon or company.”5 The infantry held the new addition to their units as more than just another 
soldier; the medic was seen as a vital part of the system. This image of the aid man has long been 
part of Second World War studies, even when the medics’ experience is different from the image 
that portrays them. 
 As medics began to take a more active role on the battlefield, they experienced the same 
horrors as the infantry to which they were attached. The General Board established that medics 
“must be thoroughly trained not only in first aid but also in the tactics of the infantry soldier.”6 
The frontline experience of the medics exposed them to the brutality of war.  This depiction is 
kept up through works by the US Army, such as the Green Books, which are after-action reports 
for the civilian population, published after the war had ended. The Green Books hold the medics 
                                                          
1 The Medical Department was responsible for all medical matters for the US Army. All medical personnel and 
facilities including frontline assets fell under their jurisdiction.  
2 John T. Greenwood & F. Clifton Berry Jr., Medics at War: Military Medicine From Colonial Times to the 21st 
Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 68. 
3 “Medic” and “aid man” can be used interchangeably; they refer to the same role within the Medical Department. 
4 The General Board, Evacuation of Human Casualties in the European Theatre of Operation (self-publish, 1945), 
4. 
5 The General Board, Evacuation of Human Casualties in the European Theatre of Operation, 1. 
6 The General Board, Evacuation of Human Casualties in the European Theatre of Operation, 1. 
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 of the Medical Department in a mythic light; within these reports, the Medical Department 
discussed in the ways the riflemen saw them, as men unafraid to risk their lives to save the 
wounded. When examining the letters and memoirs of soldiers from the Medical Department, it 
soon becomes apparent that the image created by the infantry is different from reality. The 
medics of the Second World War did not receive the thorough training that was expected of 
them, they were prone to psychological breakdowns, and under extreme conditions, they were 
even insubordinate. Their war was no different from the men they were attached to. This image 
of the unflappable medic does not hold up when the realities of combat set in.    
 
Training and its Consequences 
In both the Army and civilian medical practices, the training establishes the foundations 
of procedure and patient care. For the Army, this stage was a crucial part of a medic’s life, as it 
prepared them to care for patients treated under small arms and artillery fire. The medic or aid 
man was expected to be a highly-competent individual who was trained to save lives. In the 
Evacuation of Human Casualties in the European Theater, the General Board highlighted the 
importance of these traits: “the infantry will not accept a mediocre or inferior soldier as a 
company aid man.”7 Both high-ranking personnel and infantry in the field understood how 
important it was to have men trained in saving lives alongside those serving at the front. The 
infantry appreciated how important the aid man was to their survival. For those at the front, “a 
qualified aid man is held in the highest esteem by the combat soldier.”8 To the infantry, the 
medic was more than just another member of the platoon; he was who they relied upon when 
they were the most vulnerable.  
 The medics sent to North Africa were men who had been in the service prior to the war’s 
outbreak. One such man was Allen Towne, who enlisted in the United States Army on October 
10, 1940 and was attached to the 1st Infantry Division.9 When Towne was assigned to the “Big 
Red 1,” he had a luxury that few medics would receive later in the war as casualties mounted: 
training in a medical environment before deploying overseas. Towne was sent to the Fitzsimons 
General Hospital in Denver, Colorado for ten weeks of training.10 During his time at the general 
hospital, Towne learned many new skills that would prove necessary in the field, including how 
to properly draw blood, administer plasma, and perform a blood transfusion.11 This experience 
allowed Towne to learn how to treat patients without being under the stress of combat or a boot 
camp environment, which gave him more time to absorb and digest the necessary skills that were 
demanded of a medic. The hospital was also where Towne first faced death, relating how “two of 
the men under my care died.”12 Towne was able to learn in a structured environment, yet still 
become acquainted with the split-second decision making that accompanied medicine. This time 
in the hospital taught Towne lessons he would use throughout the war. 
                                                          
7 The General Board, Evacuation of Human Casualties in the European Theatre of Operation, 1. 
8 The General Board, Evacuation of Human Casualties in the European Theatre of Operation, 1.  
9 Allen N. Towne, Doctor Danger Forward: A World War II Memoir of a Combat Medical Aidman, First Infantry 
Division (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc Publishers, 2000), 3. 
10 Towne, Doctor Danger Forward, 5.  
11 Towne, Doctor Danger Forward, 5. 
12 Towne, Doctor Danger Forward, 5. 
2
Voces Novae, Vol. 10 [2018], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol10/iss1/3
  Partnering with hospitals also allowed the Medical Department to have access to men 
who already had experience treating patients. Dr. Zachary Friedenberg had worked as a surgical 
intern in King’s County Hospital, New York, prior to enlistment in 1939.13 Friedenberg and 
other practicing doctors and surgeons were a vital part of field hospitals. Their experience 
outside of the Army gave them the opportunity to be trained in new techniques, compared to 
outdated training films.14  
The 95th Evacuation Hospital where Friedenberg was assigned consisted of primarily 
general practice doctors from outside the military, along with twelve practicing surgeons.15 
These doctors would soon learn, however, that their civilian training would prove more valuable 
than what the Medical Department circulated. While preparing for their deployment, the 
members of the 95th were eagerly awaiting news on how to treat combat wounds: “the 
experiences of those in medical units currently treating casualties would have been of great 
value.” However, these lessons were never circulated amongst the civilian doctors. To make 
matters worse, the information they did receive was from “medical consultants, usually 
physicians and surgeons with academic backgrounds,” who “travelled to medical units, observed 
the results of treatment,” and made their own recommendations on patient care.16 This gap 
between what was occurring in the field and communicating it to those who entered the 
battlefield after the first wave was a constant dilemma throughout the war. 
 As the war raged, casualties amongst both the infantry and medical personnel mounted. 
During the war, the General Board created an internal study to see how the Medical Department 
was conducting evacuations in Europe. They dissected every aspect of care, even looking at the 
casualty rate for the aid men, and concluded that “most divisions with as much as six months of 
severe combat suffered one-hundred percent casualties amongst the company aid man.”17 This 
high casualty rate was not only unsustainable for the Medical Department, but it also jeopardized 
caring for the wounded. The problem of replacements was felt throughout the armed forces 
during the war. The fighting caused a manpower crisis in 1943 which affected all services.18 This 
shortage caused problems between the infantry and medical personnel as many senior members 
thought that the policy of placing men who had scored high on the Army General Classification 
Test, necessary for medical specialists, were being diverted from combat roles such as infantry 
officer and noncommissioned officers vital for commanding rifleman.19 This added stress led to 
medics having to be rushed through training or learning in the field rather than a hospital 
environment. 
 Robert Franklin was one such medic, rushed to the front to bring units to combat 
strength. Drafted into the Army in 1942, Franklin had no prior medical training.20 He had never 
been on a hospital floor, treated patients, or even taken a class on basic first aid. His only 
                                                          
13 Zachary Friedenberg, Hospital at War: The 95th Evacuation Hospital in World War 2 (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2004), 6. 
14 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 4. 
15 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 4 
16 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 8. 
17 The General Board, Evacuation of Human Casualties in the European Theatre of Operation, 1. 
18 Leonard L. Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army (Self Publish; 1954), 270. 
19 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System, 273.  
20 Robert, J. Franklin, Medic!: How I Fought World War II with Morphine, Sulfa, and Iodine Swabs (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 1. 
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 experience in first aid was what “I learned from sitting in an orphanage infirmary as a child and 
watching the nurse for hours.”21 During his training as a combat medic, Franklin received little 
guidance for his duties, admitting that “no doctor ever talked to us about treating wounds.”22 
Franklin was not as fortunate as Towne or Friedenberg to be placed in a medical training 
program or have prior civilian work. Instead, he was one of many replacements who relied on 
doctors and others to prepare him for his role in combat. What little knowledge he did have was 
basic first aid: “we once got instruction about pressure points and the use of tourniquets to 
control bleeding.” However, he did not receive training in “using the medicine and bandages that 
would eventually be in our medicine pouches.”23 This lack of training in a controlled 
environment created a medic that was not as prepared as the General Board said a medic should 
be. It also created a medic who, when faced with the horrors on the line, could not properly 
perform his job.  
 The need for replacements at the front also affected men who were already in training. 
Robert Smith, drafted in March of 1943, was one of the replacements who scored high on the 
Army General Classification Tests (AGCT) in the late stages of his training, prompting him to be 
transferred to the Medical Services.24 This score allowed Smith to go and train at the hospital at 
Fitzsimons. Smith was enrolled in a more intensive training regimen than Towne had 
experienced at the same hospital. Smith received a comprehensive education of anatomy, 
pharmacology, and surgical care.25 Thanks to his high score on the AGCT, Smith received 
training that provided him with comprehensive lessons in medical care. However, this training 
was short-lived. As the divide between the infantry and the other services grew with the 
replacement crisis, sacrifices were made. Orders by General George Marshall at the end of 1943 
asserted that the Army Specialized Training Program, the program that the AGCT was designed 
to assess readiness for, was to be cut dramatically, freeing men for combat roles.26 By cutting the 
program, those who were in the middle of their specialized programs were rushed through, or, 
like Smith, forced to cease altogether.27 This caused Smith and many others who were still 
considered specialists to finish their training on the battlefield rather than in a controlled 
environment.28 The manpower shortages the US Army experienced thus caused major shifts in 
the training of a major technical service.  
 Those going into the Medical Department after the limiting of AGCT candidates felt the 
effect of these changes during their time in training. Klaus Huebner had joined the medical 
Reserves Officers’ Training Corps while attending medical school.29 During his time in medical 
school, Huebner had received various forms of training within the civilian setting.30 This 
experience in the civilian health system would prepare him for treating the wounded. During his 
time at Fort Sam Houston, Huebner went through a series of field exercises designed to acquaint 
                                                          
21 Franklin, Medic!, 3. 
22 Franklin, Medic!, 3. 
23 Franklin, Medic!, 3. 
24 Robert L. Smith, “Medic” A WWII Medic Remembers (Berkeley: Creative Arts Books, 2001), 15 & 20.  
25 Smith “Medic,” 20. 
26 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System, 273. 
27 Smith, “Medic,” 26. 
28 Smith, “Medic,” 26. 
29 Klaus H. Huebner, Long Walk Through War: A Combat Doctor’s Diary (College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1987), 3.  
30 Huebner, Long Walk Through War, 3. 
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 him with the men he would be fighting alongside.31 Huebner began to question why he was 
assigned to the infantry rather than to a hospital: “my orders came to report to duty, they read 
88th Infantry Division. This was somewhat of a blow.”32 The manpower shortages at the front 
had forced the Medical Department to send men who would have been better suited for hospital 
work to serve alongside the infantry. During his time with the infantry, Huebner realized his 
assignment was not determined by “background or IQ,” but what demands the Department had.33 
The high casualty count of the war forced the Department to address the issue of saving lives on 
the front lines first and in the hospital second.  
 The time that Huebner spent with the infantry also highlighted the dilemma of how 
medics were seen within the Army and their roles as noncombatants. Troops of the Medical 
Department fell under the category of noncombatants because of their role on the battlefield, and 
thus they had various rules of war associated with them. One such rule was their protection and 
safeguard: “Medical troops, installations, and equipment are to be protected so long as they are 
not used to commit acts injurious to the enemy.”34 Yet Huebner was receiving weapons training 
at Fort Sam Houston: “I learned many other things… such as good knowledge of the M-1 rifle, 
Carbine,” as well as heavy weapons such as “Browning automatic rifle, bazooka, and 60-mm 
mortar.”35 Though an officer of the Medical Department, Huebner was still receiving training 
that was designed to end lives rather than save them. Other medics had similar experiences, 
including  Robert Franklin, who was also an enlisted soldier with the Medical Department. While 
Franklin was assigned to a medical unit, “all our training was for infantry fighting close-order 
drill;” during weapons training he “qualified as ‘marksman’ with a Springfield #03 rifle.”36 By 
giving these men weapons training, the Army created a paradox within them: fighter and healer. 
Both Franklin and Huebner had received combat training rather than working on technical 
medical skills, as the leaders of frontline units and the technical services were fighting each other 
for the desperately-needed replacements.37 These two men’s training regimen highlights the 
Army’s thought process during the manpower shortage: to get men who could fight to the front 
even if other vital units were understrength, units that the infantry depended on.   
 The Medical Department had a crucial role throughout the Second World War. It was 
tasked with saving as many men as possible from succumbing to wounds sustained in combat. 
This was no easy task, and the men who were assigned to perform it needed to be well-trained to 
handle the changing situation on the battlefield. Training was fundamental to the role the 
Medical Department would play in the war, yet it varied greatly from soldier to soldier. It was 
not a standardized process like the infantry’s boot camp. Some recruits, such as Towne and 
Friedenberg, were able to learn how to treat wounded soldiers, as well as other patient needs, 
well before the conflict started. Replacements like Franklin, on the other hand, were expected to 
learn on the field. Even those lucky enough to get specialized training well into US involvement 
in the war were casualties of the constant need to rush men up to stem the bleeding at the front. 
This rushed training caused many men to learn under the chaotic conditions of combat how to 
                                                          
31 Huebner, Long Walk Through War, 4. 
32 Huebner, Long Walk Through War, 3. 
33 Huebner, Long Walk Through War, 3. 
34 US War Department, The Battle Field Medical Manual 1944 (United Kingdom: Amberley, 2014), 16. 
35 Huebner, Long Walk Through War, 4. 
36 Franklin, Medic!, 3. 
37 The technical services are services that fall outside of typical combat roles such as the engineer corps, medical 
services, signal corps, and other vital parts of the army. 
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 properly treat the wounded. This gap in standardized training in patient care caused a lack of 
consistency in treating the various combat wounds of the war, as well as how different medics 
would react in combat situations. 
 Each soldier reacted differently to combat; the same can be said for medics. Towne’s first 
combat experience was landing on the beach near Oran, Algeria during Operation Torch.38 His 
first time in combat not only involved the horrors of war but the effects of a poorly-planned 
operation. When Towne landed alongside the infantry, the only medical supplies he had to work 
with were “what we could carry in our large haversack vests.”39 The planners of Operation Torch 
did not have any background in the logistics of medical supplies, and thus they did not know 
how to best allocate the various equipment that would be needed to treat the casualties that 
mounted on the beaches.40 Because of this supply shortage, Towne had to adapt and treat patients 
with what little he had. Relying on his training, Towne was able to help the wounded on the first 
day of Operation Torch with a few “dressings, sulfa powder, morphine syrettes, bandages and 
other supplies,” a fraction of what he would normally have accompanying him from the aid 
station to which he was assigned41 The supply problems of the landing forced Towne to 
economize both care and medical supplies. 
 The medics, while dealing with the supply problems of the landing, also had to contend 
with the confusion of combat. Towne and the men alongside him were forced to remember all 
the skills they learned under the stress of combat. This was a difficult task, with some men 
succumbing to the confusion of battle. One such soldier was Billy Edwards, a member of the 
same collection station as Towne. According to Towne, as they were treating a soldier with a 
large wound to his shoulder, Edwards went to “pour pure alcohol in the gaping wound when I 
stopped him.”42 Although the men had been trained to be ready for combat, the stress had 
temporarily impeded their actions. The initial shock of combat had caused Billy Edwards, the aid 
man, to forget his training. According to the Battlefield Medical Manual, “there is no substance 
which should be used by the first-aid man to wash a wound.”43 The manual listed various reasons 
why, from further contaminating a wound to substances not being strong enough to kill 
bacteria.44 While these men had received training on how to deal with combat, they could still 
have lapses in judgment when treating the wounded.  
 Other men, like Franklin, went into combat knowing that their lack of understanding of 
medicine would affect patient care. Franklin was aware of the how his lack of training affected 
the men under his care. During the landing in Sicily, Operation Husky, Franklin had to make 
decisions that affected the wellbeing of multiple men. Shortly after landing in Sicily, Franklin 
had to treat a group of freezing men who had been soaked in water from the landing.45 In order to 
remedy their state, Franklin poured some ammonia into canteen cups for them. “I thought it 
                                                          
38 Towne, Doctor Danger Forward, 19. 
39 Towne, Doctor Danger Forward, 19. 
40 Charles M. Wiltse, The Medical Department: Medical Services in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters 
(Washington D.C.: Center Of Military History United States Army, 1987) 207. 
41 Towne, Doctor Danger Forward, 19. 
42 Towne, Doctor Danger Forward, 19. 
43 US War Department, The Battle Field Medical Manual 1944, 122.   
44 US War Department, The Battle Field Medical Manual 1944, 122. 
45 Franklin, Medic!, 10. 
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 might warm them. Hell, for all I knew about medicine, I might have been poisoning them.”46 
Franklin’s lack of training with medicine could have put these men in danger. The medic was 
forced to make calls in the field that had long-term ramifications for the troops being treated. 
Another such incident involved a GI with an unknown pain. When a jeep with two officers drove 
by, Franklin managed to get a five-gallon water can from the reluctant officers to treat the GI. 
After the soldier drank and vomited the water, Franklin discovered that he had ingested 
unripened grapes, causing his stomachache.47 Yet even in this moment of triumph, Franklin 
mentions how he got lucky with his treatment: “yet he might of just well had appendicitis. We 
were far from our company aid station, so I took desperate chances.”48 While the Medical 
Department needed to get men on the front, doing so could have cost many men their lives due to 
insufficient training.  
  One thing that the battlefield taught many medical personnel was the ramifications of 
their speed or delay in a way teaching could not: with the lives of patients. Doc Friedenberg 
learned this lesson during his first engagement in the landings on mainland Italy. It was not until 
two days after landing on the Italian coast that the men of the 95th Evacuation Hospital were 
finally able to set up their equipment, even though they had accompanied the infantry during the 
initial landing.49 This delay was catastrophic for the wounded from the previous forty-eight 
hours. While the battle raged, the wounded were left to lie out in the sun, baking under its heat.50 
This heat, mixed with the various wounds, created a deadly combination of gas gangrene. This 
disease is caused when a bacteria of the Clostridium family is able to grow in a wound due to 
dead tissue; as it mixes with this tissue, it creates a toxic gas that proves lethal as it spreads 
through the body.51 Many of those treated by the 95th on the first night the hospital was 
operational were wounded forty-eight hours prior, allowing the gas to spread within them.52 With 
the delay in establishing the hospital, wounds that could have been easily treated proved fatal due 
to gas gangrene.53 Friedenberg, fresh off a two year internship, was ill-prepared for the mass 
casualties of the battle.54 Through this event, the members of the 95th learned just how valuable 
time was on the battlefield.  
 As combat raged and casualties mounted, medics had to quickly diagnose the wounded 
and move to the next patient. The diagnosis of wounds relied heavily on the training one 
received before being sent to war. During combat, a multitude of various wounds can be 
inflicted, the most common wounds being incised, laceration, and puncture wounds, which all 
have separate treatment procedures.55 Lacerated and puncture wounds, caused by shell fragments 
and bullets, respectively, can carry with them debris or powder, leading to wound 
contamination.56 Incisions, on the other hand, are wounds caused by sharp objects such as a knife 
                                                          
46 Franklin, Medic!, 10. 
47 Franklin, Medic!, 17-18. 
48 Franklin, Medic!, 18. 
49 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 37 & 44. 
50 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 45. 
51 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 46. 
52 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 45. 
53 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 44 & 46. 
54Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 45. 
55 US War Department, The Battle Field Medical Manual 1944, 138-139. 
56 US War Department, The Battle Field Medical Manual 1944, 138-140. 
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 or bayonet.57 As a battle raged, casualties of each type mounted, and the medical personnel had 
to adapt to a growing casualty rate. To cope with this, medics were trained to fill out an 
Emergency Treatment Tag, a detailed description of all treatments a wounded man had received 
as well as a rudimentary diagnosis.58 These cards were used to make a complete list of all 
wounds inflicted on a casualty. But due to the nature of combat, this procedure in practice was 
too time-consuming, and medics began implementing their own forms of communicating 
treatments in battle. One such signal was morphine syrettes pinned to a soldier’s clothing to 
indicate how much of the substance was given to avoid an overdose.59 Though the Triage card 
was an important part of frontline medicine, filling one out could have been lethal for medics and 
their patients. Training could not prepare medics for everything in the field; the reality often 
proved overwhelming. 
 Another thing that training could never prepare troops out in the field for was how a 
medic’s job went beyond saving lives to comforting the dying. The medics were for many the 
last interaction they had with the world. Each person confronts death in a different manner on the 
battlefield. The first time Franklin was faced with this moment was when he treated a downed 
enemy pilot. When his unit came across a downed German fighter, a doctor from the company 
aid station told Franklin to “make him comfortable,” which Franklin did not know how to do.60 
Franklin had to confront death in the most intimate way possible, by being part of the process. 
He failed to realize that the pain killer, morphine, that he carried could comfort the dying pilot. 
Instead of administering a syrette, he sat with the young German pilot as he passed in the cockpit 
of his downed fighter.61 Other aid men tried all they could to comfort the wounded in their final 
moments. While Friedenberg was combating his gangrene epidemic, he did all he could with 
what he had to alleviate the pain. As the casualties came in, soldiers and civilians alike, 
Friedenberg distributed morphine liberally to his growing number of patients.62 He understood 
that in order to make the dying comfortable he had to numb the pain that foreshadowed death. He 
tried to do all he could with the little that was available after the landing. It was not until morning 
that Friedenberg came to terms with the dead and the horrors of the war: “I realized how 
impotent a doctor was without the drugs and tools of his profession.”63 Simply having the tools 
of the profession were not enough, however; in Franklin’s case with the pilot, he had the tool but 
did not have the knowledge to use it effectively. The two men are different sides of the coin. 
Franklin had all the tools at his disposal to comfort a dying man but did not know how to use 
them. Friedenberg had the knowledge to save the dying under his care but only had the tools to 
make death comfortable. The difficulty the troops of the Medical Department faced was that no 
matter how hard they tried, they could not save every patient. Sometimes saving the patient 
meant helping them move on rather than continuing to feel pain. 
 The consequences of the training gap affected how many medical personnel treated the 
wounded of the war. Men who had more training had the advantage of entering the combat zone 
with some idea of what was happening around them, while others struggled to find their ground 
                                                          
57 US War Department, The Battle Field Medical Manual 1944, 138. 
58 Graham A. Cosmas & Albert E. Cowdrey, The Medical Department Medical Services in the European Theater of 
Operations (Washington D.C.: Center Of Military History United States Army, 1992), 361. 
59Cosmas & Cowdrey, The Medical Department Medical Services in the European Theater of Operations, 363. 
60 Franklin, Medic!, 15-16. 
61 Franklin, Medic!, 16. 
62 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 45. 
63 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 45. 
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 in the maelstrom. As the men of the Medical Department became more experienced alongside 
their rifleman counterparts, they were able to adapt to the changing situations that combat 
brought to the aid stations and hospitals, just like it did to the men at the front. Events like the 
manpower shortage in 1943 created paradoxes in which men were taught how to take lives when 
they were charged with saving them. Even though they demanded highly-trained and competent 
troops, the burdens of war made this ideal hard to achieve.64 The increased casualties the 
Medical Department and the infantry faced quickened training to stem the bleeding at the front. 
The men who made it to the front came face to face with the wounded and dead that the war had 
brought, casualties that the inexperienced aid men had to put back together in hopes of saving 
what little they could.  
 
Unflappable 
 The medics of the Second World War were highly respected amongst the infantry for 
rushing into harm’s way in order to save the wounded on the battlefield. For the Army, only a 
handful of men were allowed to hold the title and perform the task. As discussed earlier, the 
General Board emphasized that “It has been proven without question that only the highest type 
of individual is suitable for assignment as company aid man.”65 It is through statements like this, 
made by the General Board, and the close relationship of the medic and aid man with the troops 
on the line that members of the Medical Department were deemed unflappable. This myth 
portrayed the medics as something more than they actually were: men who were thrown into the 
horrors of modern combat with the sole task of saving as many men as they could with what little 
time they had, and who reacted to the horrors just as any other human would. 
 The relationship between the infantry and the medics was formed after the First World 
War when steps were taken to improve the time between being wounded and getting treatment. 
The medic position was created in the interwar years when the Medical Department discovered 
that the best way to save lives was reducing the time to treatment.66 Medics were embedded with 
infantry units to ensure that a soldier received the quickest time to treatment, on the battlefield 
itself rather than at an aid station out of harm’s way. Medics were no longer their own separate 
entity but members of the unit. Doctor Klaus Huebner reflected on his relationship with the men 
he served alongside: “living with the men daily, treating them, and moving among them… give 
me a profound knowledge of their character, ability, and mental stability.”67 This close 
relationship drove how the infantry saw the medics, the only thing keeping them from bleeding 
out on the battlefield.  
 However, the men of the Medical Department were not immune to the horrors of combat. 
They struggled to cope with the events of war alongside the infantry and could easily buckle 
from the stresses of the battlefield. Because the medic was part of the first echelon of care, they 
worked under direct enemy fire with death all around. Allen Towne remembered, “I found you 
either get used to this life or one of two things happen. You could go into an anxiety state or… 
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 you could take an extreme measure and shoot yourself.”68 The men of the Medical Department 
saw the infantry at their worst possible moments and were expected to keep calm and perform 
their task no matter what. In the preface to his memoir, Huebner commented extensively on how 
important remaining collected was to his job: “A battalion surgeon learned to remain calm in any 
situation and show no emotion no matter the casualty.”69 If the medic lost his cool on the 
battlefield, it would place the lives of all those in his care in jeopardy.  
 When medics could not withstand the pressures of war, the people most affected were the 
patients they were sworn to protect. Towne experienced this first-hand as he was treating a GI 
who was “on the operating litter with a deep shell-fragment wound in his chest,” so deep it 
“penetrated his lung.”70 This casualty’s life rested in the hands of Towne and the men around 
him. When bombers flew over the aid station, “everyone left the tent and dived for their holes, 
and I was left alone with the wounded man.”71  As the men dove for their foxholes, the men of 
the Medical Department betrayed the trust of the men they were sworn to protect. The sudden 
departure from the surgery by those inside, including the aid station commander, Captain 
Tegmeyer, violated the core procedures of the medical practice. Tegmeyer was the acting 
operating surgeon during the incident, meaning that he was the sole person in charge of all 
conduct in the operating room. He was “responsible for the patients’ life and for the successful 
outcome of the operation.”72  In this instance, the men of Towne’s aid station not only betrayed 
the trust of their patient, an infantryman who relied on them to live, but also violated the chain of 
command within the operating room.  
  Once Towne deployed to Europe, occurrences of battlefield breakdowns became more 
frequent. One such occasion occurred when an anti-aircraft (AA) battery near the aid station 
came under tank fire. After a German tank had been shelling the AA for twenty minutes, Towne 
realized that some of the men at the battery were still alive and wounded.73 However, in order to 
treat the wounded, he had to rally the litter bearers, also known as stretcher bearers, of his aid 
station to accompany him to the gun emplacement.74 According to the myth of the medic, these 
men would have rushed into harm’s way to save the AA gunners, but not on this night. The men 
were terrified to move forward, and Towne had to convince them to help the wounded, 
illustrating the stress medical personnel were under during the war.  
 Medics were also tasked with patching men who were torn apart back together. During 
his time in Italy, Franklin had been pushing into the mountains with the advance, and during one 
encounter with German artillery, he reached a point of near breakdown. During an artillery 
bombardment, his company’s command post was struck. The shelling left several men wounded, 
and as he approached, “the first thing I saw froze me.”75 Franklin had come across seven 
casualties; three had been killed by the shell fire as the shrapnel tore them apart.76 Franklin was 
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 terrified as he treated a replacement who had come up to the line a few days before the barrage.77 
The replacement’s jaw was blown off by a piece of shrapnel; “his eyes looked terrified while I 
bandaged him.”78 Franklin was no stranger to the death and destruction of artillery fire, but this 
one incident changed how his platoon operated. One of the sergeants came up to help Franklin 
but quickly walked away when he saw his friend torn apart by the shell fragments.79 Being at the 
front, aid men were susceptible to the same horrors as the infantry and were just as vulnerable to 
the fire of the enemy. The only difference was that no one was there to comfort the medics when 
they reached their limit. 
 Robert Smith experienced the same horrors during the Ardennes offensive in December 
of 1944. As the rifle battalion he was attached to engaged German armor and artillery, the losses 
were devastating. “Dave and I were busy bandaging wounds from rifle fire” as well as “trying to 
hold together extremities blown apart by cannon and mortar fire.”80 The Ardennes was the 
breaking point for many US soldiers during the war, as casualties mounted during the fierce 
German attack. Smith and his fellow aid men were forced to act on instinct as “the shock of the 
severity of the injuries we saw, we probably would not have been able to function,” if they took 
the time to think. 81 Smith and the other medics with him were forced into an environment that 
they could not comprehend, the violence of which was the only thing keeping them running. As 
the men around him fell, Smith struggled with men who had their jaws blown off and limbs 
hanging to the body by strands of tissue, hoping that the decisions he made had a chance of 
saving the men under his care.82 The nature of the fighting had caused Smith to override the 
impulse to contemplate what was going on, to react and treat without dwelling on the scenes in 
front of him, scenes that would come back to him at night when he tried to escape from the war 
around him.83 The war had brought men to their breaking points in every branch of the military, 
and the men of the Medical Department were no exception. They could only take so much death 
and destruction before they themselves succumbed to the events around them, becoming numb at 
times. 
 Huebner on the other hand reached his breaking point as his unit attacked Santa Maria 
Infante, Italy. The road to Santa Maria Infante became clogged with US tanks and transports, 
providing a tempting target for German artillery: “the Germans’ artillery which [had] been silent 
all day, now opened up with everything at its command.”84 As the artillery fired upon the 
clumped-together US forces, Huebner and the rest of his medical team sought shelter in a gully 
across from the chaos.85 While the shell fire raged, Huebner’s concern lay not with the men 
under his care but a guide who was to take him to a different aid station: “Where the hell is my 
guide?” ran through his brain, along with, “I can’t sweat this murderous fire out much longer.”86 
Huebner’s own self-preservation kicked in. Like the men who had abandoned Towne in North 
Africa and refused to move in Europe, Huebner was concerned with his own safety rather than 
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 that of the men under his charge. As soon as he was able to, he abandoned the battlefield: “At a 
moment when I think the shelling [had] somewhat slackened, I departed.”87 Huebner had reached 
a point where he could no longer take the bombardment from enemy artillery and left.  His 
actions were not that of the unflappable medic, but of a man who had had enough of combat and 
its aftermath.  
 The troops of the Medical Department did not just crack from the sights of the battlefield. 
Over-burdened from patient flow, men were fatigued, their environments pushing them to their 
limits both mentally and physically. During the gangrene epidemic that Friedenberg treated as 
mentioned earlier, not only was Friedenberg dealing with the gore and horror of war, but with the 
cries of despair as well. As he tended his various patients, their wails filled the hospital: “Mia 
bambino…mama mia…the Lord is my shepherd…Mother of Mercy…Mein Gott…Doc, do 
something I can’t breathe.”88 Friedenberg was fresh out of both internships and school, yet he 
was expected to have the mental fortitude to take charge of more than 40 patients.89 He could 
only do so much for the various patients under his care with what little he had. The limited 
supplies and equipment that were available were not the tools needed to treat the volume or types 
of cases that he had.90 Friedenberg was facing a situation that every person in the Medical 
Department feared: not being able to treat those under their protection. In his first combat 
experience, Friedenberg was faced with this reality, an event that affected the way he saw his 
role in the war. With this one event, he realized “how impotent a doctor was without the drugs 
and tools of his profession;”91 he came to grasp how devastating war could be. By realizing both 
how ineffective he could be and how quickly death could set in, Friedenberg had reached a point 
of despair that followed him through the war as he treated patients. Events like these terrified the 
men who were expected to compartmentalize the events around them and left them with their 
own trauma as they continued to treat wound after wound. 
 The men of the Medical Department had to perform their tasks under harrowing fire. 
Medics at the front and aid men in aid stations were both susceptible to enemy fire and 
bombardment, and as such, they had their own breaking points, just like the men they treated. 
The nature of the medical field had put these men in an environment where they had to dwell on 
the devastation of war. Unlike the infantry who had to keep moving and could not absorb the 
carnage around them, the medical troops lived in it. They saw the devastation that modern war 
had wrought on the human body. Bandaging torn flesh in ways they had barely trained for, the 
medics were expected to stay calm under fire. Their presence was a moral boost for the infantry, 
but these men were not always the anchor the troops needed them to be. They were human; they 
could only absorb so much death and destruction before they themselves were no longer combat 
effective and could not perform their duty on the battlefield. 
 
Psychological Wounds and Treatments 
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 Throughout the war, the US Army struggled with various forms of psychological 
wounds. As the war progressed, the ways that these wounds were diagnosed differed between the 
Medical Department and the medics at the front. As more and more men were suffering from 
psychological ailments, the medics and the Department struggled with how to treat the afflicted 
men.  
Before the war, the US Army and its counterparts around the world were still thinking in 
terms of the First World War when it came to psychological wounds. In a 1939 article in the 
British Medical Journal, Maurice B. Wright discussed, “How can we differentiate the real 
coward?”92 In 1939, the world was seeing those who suffered from psychological wounds in war 
as cowards. The article goes on to mention a form of anxiety called an “Anxiety Stupor.”93  This 
form of anxiety was very similar to what the Army would call “Hysterical Unconsciousness” late 
into the Second World War.94 Wright described these wounds as “lying apparently in deep sleep 
or unconscious.”95 The anxiety stupor caused unconsciousness, forcing a person to shut down all 
mental functions. The casualty would no longer be in control of their ability to function. This 
wound had the same causes and effects as its physical counterparts, yet those in military 
medicine considered it an act of cowardice rather than an actual combat wound. 
 Wright’s article was focused on the idea of hysteria and its impact on those in combat. 
Anxiety stupor was one of these hysterical states. The crux of the article was how terror affects 
those in combat situations. Wright understood that all the forms of hysteria he discussed were 
manifested in the ideas of a person becoming overwhelmed by the events surrounding him or 
her. Anxiety hysteria was an example of this, being manifested by “the dangerous situation, 
whether past, present, or anticipated.”96 What Wright described was similar to what was termed 
“shellshock” in the First World War. The “accompaniments of fear are so intense that no amount 
of reassurance or removal to a place of safety” will calm the casualty effectively: “the effect of 
fear on the whole automatic system has for the time being put out of action.”97 These casualties 
were in a catatonic state and could not function in their previous manner. The casualties were so 
incapacitated that they “will not come themselves to the casualty clearing station,” but were 
“brought there, often as stretcher cases.”98 Wright’s understanding of psychological wounds in 
1939 was the product of the First World War. This perception influenced the Second World 
War’s understanding of how to treat mental afflictions. 
 The British Medical Journal published several articles that had similar viewpoints to 
Wright, including “Medical Problems in War Neuroses in War,” written by E. Wittkower and J. 
P. Spillane. While Wright explored the origins of hysteria, Wittkower and Spillane looked at 
how neuroses manifested themselves. Wittkower and Spillane saw psychological wounds not as 
casualties but as men seeking attention: “under such stresses these individuals increasingly 
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 regressed to a narcissistic level of development.”99 These diagnoses called into question whether 
men suffering from wounds caused by mental trauma were even suffering at all or simply acting 
out. These actions were described as “a state of infantile helplessness, with complete surrender to 
their suffering and a need to be pampered, cared for, and petted like children.”100 The divide 
between wounded and pretender grew wider with this idea as it devalued men who were 
suffering from psychological wounds. With this language, the sick were no longer patients but 
children to be taken care of.  
 Wittkower and Spillane also made reference to what medics who fought earlier in the war 
called the “anxiety state.” The anxiety state as described by Wittkower and Spillane had many 
moving parts; its development and manifestation took on several stages. The first major 
description of the anxiety state was that it is a form of fatigue from prolonged exposure to 
combat.101 An anxiety state manifested itself in various ways, including hallucinogenic sleep, “in 
which the main events from the day appeared in troublesome visions.”102 The constant repetition 
of the horrors of war wore on the soldier at a time when he expected reprieve from the sights 
around him. This tore at the soldier’s psyche, creating a state that “developed fear and horror of 
the sights around him and was unable to keep his mind away from the possibility of injury.”103 
This stage of the anxiety saw soldiers’ bodies hijacked by fear. They were no longer in complete 
control of their actions and were no longer combat effective.   
 Ideas such as these shaped how the Army saw the psychologically wounded in the 
Second World War. In time, medics on the front line realized that more had to be done to help 
those with wounds that could not be easily seen. Medics learned that men were suffering from 
the pressures and stresses of combat. After seeing their friends die or be brutally maimed in front 
of them, simply soldiering on was no longer an option. As the US entered the Second World 
War, the ideas of the last war bolstered its understanding of the impact of these psychological 
wounds for those suffering through them.  
Influenced by the developments in the prewar years, the Medical Department was finding 
new ways of diagnosing psychological casualties. The Battle Field Medical Manual 1944 
referred to these episodes as “hysterical unconsciousness,” instructing medics to treat the men as 
if they were acting up for attention and leave them be.104 This older method of taking care of 
broken men was similar to ideas from the First World War. Men who could not take the pressure 
of combat were treated as if they were attempting to get out of fighting. By claiming that the 
soldier was falsifying his wounded mind, he was placed on the same level as men who physically 
wounded themselves to avoid combat. During his time in Africa, Towne saw many of these men 
who had “shot themselves in the hands or feet;” they even acted differently than most wounded 
in that “the men seemed to be in more pain than the more severely wounded men.”105 To the 
Medical Department, these men were the same as the psychologically wounded early in the war; 
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 both groups were acting up to get out of combat. However, the medics at the front like Towne 
saw the psychologically wounded  in a different light.  
Medics had a vital role on the battlefield that required them to be close to the line and 
even behind it, close to the wounded and the dying, and even the dead. Early on in the invasion 
of North Africa, Allen Towne encountered his first psychological casualty. Towne was sent with 
a squad of medics to collect a group of US GIs that had been killed in an ambush.106 The scene 
that Towne encountered startled the medics “they were lying in various positions… One had his 
water canteen in his hands” and “another soldier was lying on his back with his hand frozen in 
rigor mortis, holding rosary beads over his eyes.”107 Towne and his squad were not prepared for 
the scene they encountered.  While their job surrounded them with men who were mortally 
wounded and dying, Towne and other members of the Medical Department were not trained to 
deal with collecting the dead off of the battlefield. This task was reserved for the Mortuary 
Corps, but in North Africa these units had not yet arrived.108 This event shook many of the men 
who had accompanied Towne; one man started to have a nervous breakdown, and needed to be 
restrained and sedated.109 Despite their medical position, some men could not take it, and they 
broke. 
At the front, the medics and aid men saw the same horrors of war that the infantry saw, 
understanding how the chaos of combat shook men to their cores in a way that officials and 
analysts could not. Towne’s aid station changed how they labeled the psychologically wounded; 
they abandoned the term “shell shocked” for “anxiety state,” limiting the stigma that came with 
the condition. 110 The men at the front did not let the anxious men sit and wallow in their tortured 
minds but gave them sedatives such as morphine to keep them calm while being evacuated. 111 
The men who suffered from these anxiety states were not men who wanted an out or attention 
but men who had to come to grips with war. Those working in aid stations had to come to terms 
with this as well; medics sometimes slipped into anxiety states during high casualty battles 
because they could not cope with the trauma around them.112 Sedatives alone could not keep men 
calm, and partway through the war the various frontline aid stations and personnel learned what 
others had done to treat the psychologically wounded.  
One such unit was the 95th Evacuation Hospital. The aid men and nurses of the 95th evac 
hospital treated the men they called “battle fatigued,” men who needed rest above all else. 113 
These men had suffered more than just anxiety attacks or hysterical outbursts; they were 
mentally and physically exhausted from the stresses of combat. It was this idea that led them to 
treat these men as they would treat any fatigue, with rest. The 95th created a treatment system 
that revolved around uninterrupted rest for an extended period of time. 114 The 95th gave the 
fatigued both sleeping medication and sedatives to place soldiers in a deep sleep, resting both 
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 mind and body.115 During this deep rest, the men were able to escape the horrors of the front line 
and the chaos of the aid station. What was most important about this treatment was its high 
success rate in treating the men who were evacuated to the hospital. Doctor Zachary Friedenberg, 
one of the physicians in charge of the hospital, remarked that a majority of the men “went back 
to their units within forty-eight hours.”116 Instead of the soldier being left alone and unable to 
fight or sedated in a hospital in the rear of the line, men were able to rejoin the fight. This rest 
treatment was eventually copied by the other units later in the war.  
 The resting treatment was taken to extremes during the Battle of the Bulge. What started 
as an effective treatment for those who had reached their breaking point turned from a break 
from horrors to reliving them. During the battle, the Medical Department issued an injection 
containing sodium pentanol which put GIs into a lucid dream state.117 During this state, the 
soldier’s dreams could easily be manipulated; doctors and aid men would take advantage of this 
by recreating the events that broke the soldier before arrival.118 In the War Department Film 
Bulletin 184, a doctor and several aid men are shown recreating the sounds of an artillery strike 
as a soldier who was injected with sodium pentanol screams in agony and makes himself as 
small as possible to avoid the incoming “shrapnel,” thinking he is reliving the events that brought 
him to the safety of the hospital.119 The Medical Department believed that by augmenting the rest 
treatment that the 95th saw high success rates with, audio recreations would help the wounded get 
over their shock. They failed to realize that the new treatment created more pain and suffering 
then regular sleep could ever cause.  
The Medical Department also implemented pure sleep treatment like the 95th, but with 
more powerful medications. Again, the Medical Department issued new drugs designed to 
enhance the rest treatment. Sodium-ammiol was given to troops to put them in a deep sleep for a 
period of forty-eight to seventy-two hours at a time.120 The pill was so effective at knocking the 
exhausted GIs out that it received the nickname “blue 88” amongst troops, a reference to the 
German artillery piece obliterating them at the front.121 The Medical Department thought this 
heavily-medicated sleep was enough to allow troops to rest and recover from the devastating 
offensive. However, the blue 88, combined with the injections of sodium pentanol, had the 
opposite effect. Men had reached a point during the Battle of the Bulge where no amount of rest 
could prepare them for returning to the front; the treatments that were designed to get men back 
into the fight quickly broke what little morale the devastated troops had.122 They were 
completely unwilling to return to the frontlines. When asked to tell men they were returning to 
combat, a Medical Department Officer stated, “I couldn’t tell these men they were going back. I 
broke down and said I never wanted to do that again.”123 The faces of the broken proved too 
                                                          
115 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 59. 
116 Friedenberg, Hospital at War, 59.  
117 War Department Film Bulletin 184: Psychiatric Procedures In the Combat Area, directed by United States War 
Department (1944, Washington D.C.) Digital Archive. https://archive.org/details/FB-184. 
118 War Department Film Bulletin 184. 
119 War Department Film Bulletin 184. 
120 Battle of the Bulge the Deadliest Battle of World War II, directed by Jeremy Stavenhagen and Gary Steele (1994; 
Boston, MA: PBS, 2004), DVD. 
121 Battle of the Bulge the Deadliest Battle of World War II.. 
122 Battle of the Bulge the Deadliest Battle of World War II. 
123 Battle of the Bulge the Deadliest Battle of World War II. 
16
Voces Novae, Vol. 10 [2018], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol10/iss1/3
 much for the officer. The horrors of war proved that the Medical Department personnel was 
unable to cope with a growing number of psychologically wounded. 
The Medical Department throughout the war faced a rapid shift in how men with 
psychological wounds were treated. The shift from anxiety state to battle fatigue not only 
changed the diagnosis process but how men were treated as well. By changing how they thought, 
the Medical Department allowed for new and different ways of treating those who were suffering 
from wounds that were unseen and could not be bandaged by traditional means. The stigma of 
the anxiety state that was mentioned in the Wittkower and Spillane article created the idea that a 
soldier was regressing to a coward-like state. By 1943, units such as the 95th Evacuation Hospital 
in Italy had recognized the stigma associated with the anxiety state. By treating the men as 
fatigued, the 95th created a new diagnosis that did not paint the soldier in a negative light. They 
went from men with weak and fragile psyches to men suffering from the natural wear and tear of 
combat. This allowed for the expansion of treatment options for the medic on the front, as well 
as the ability to understand which methods did and did not work. The treatment of wounds 
beyond the physical was just as important as treating the maimed and dying.  
 
The Reality and Reactions of Medics in the Field 
 The men of the Medical Department had the sole purpose of keeping wounded soldiers 
alive and getting them back into action as soon as possible. For this reason, they had to find the 
best way of treating patients that worked effectively in battlefield conditions. This created  
disagreements between the men on the front and those at the top over various procedures and 
needs. Throughout the war, this conflict became part of how frontline units treated patients as 
they fought to save as many men as possible, affecting procedures, equipment, and even chain of 
command. When it came to saving lives on the battlefield, where seconds mattered, medical 
personnel did not have time for procedures that hindered their ability to provide care. 
 A key component of the evacuation of wounded soldiers from the battlefield was the 
various evacuation echelons that stretched from the combat zone to deep behind friendly lines. 
At the crux of these echelons were the effectiveness of the various transportation vehicles the 
Medical Department had at its disposal. At the front, litter bearers had access to three tools for 
carrying the wounded: a collapsible field carrier, a 1/4 ton trunk also known as the “jeep,” and an 
M3A2 half-track.124 In their review of the evacuation process, the General Board members were 
surprised by how medics reacted to each of these three assets. The first, the collapsible field 
carrier, was completely phased out on the front line due to its lack of popularity amongst the 
medics.125 The remaining  two carrying methods, the jeep and the M3A2 half-track, were a point 
of contention between what the Medical Department intended and what the medics encountered 
on the front lines. 
 The M3A2 half-track and the jeep both were issued to the Medical Department to help in  
easing the wounded onto litters and rapid transportation to aid stations, but due to the nature of 
war, the two vehicles had dramatically different receptions from those at the front. The M3A2 
was issued to both infantry and the Medical Department as an armored transport.126 Designed to 
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 protect the occupants from small arms fire and fragments from explosives, on paper, it fulfilled 
an important role in evacuation.127 However, being deployed to both infantry and medical 
installations caused severe problems for those who set out to use these trucks to aid the wounded. 
One of the greatest drawbacks of the M3A2 was its shared nature between the infantry and the 
litter bearers; as the General Board learned, “It bears a close resemblance to armored combat 
vehicles and tends to draw anti-tank fire from the enemy.”128 For the men inside, this was a 
devastating event, as Robert Smith experienced firsthand.  
Smith was part of a five-vehicle convoy that was trying to break out of a German 
encirclement near Wallendorf, Germany, and attempting to get severely wounded men out of the 
combat zone.129 The M3A2 was a perfect vehicle due to its protection from small arms fire, but 
on that night, the Germans responded to the fleeing armored transports with cannon fire. “The 
explosions shook our carrier, and then we heard the massive explosion caused by one of the 
other half-tracks being hit and exploding;” the parade of M3A2’s was too tempting of a target for 
German gunners.130 The M3A2 was issued with the intention of protecting the wounded troops 
being transported to various echelons of care, but for some, its link to the US armored infantry 
led to their deaths.  
 The other alternative mode of transportation for the men at the front was the 1/4 ton truck 
or jeep. This vehicle was popular amongst the medical staff due to its stark difference to the 
M3A2 and the collapsible carrier. The first major advantage over the M3A2 was the smaller 
profile of the jeep, making it harder to spot than other vehicles by enemy gun crews.131 This, 
combined with its speed, made the jeep, according to the General Board, “the most popular and 
widely used form of motor transportation available for frontline evacuation.”132 The jeep’s speed, 
shortening the time to move patients, coupled with its low silhouette, cemented its role in aid 
stations. This popularity was seen in the General Board report. Any attempt to redesign the jeep 
was rejected: “it is believed that any attempt to design an enclosed type of ambulance for 
evacuation forward of the battalion aid station would result in the loss of the desirable 
characteristics which made this vehicle so universally popular and useful.”133 The medics’ own 
input and experience at the front was used to ensure that patient care was being achieved as 
effectively as possible. Even when some thought the jeep lacked several characteristics crucial 
for an ambulance vehicle, the medics’ experience deterred those who saw the jeep as an 
insufficient medical transport.  
The jeep also became the central part of Robert Smith’s revolutionary idea for evacuating 
wounded in the Battle of the Bulge. After receiving a field promotion to technical sergeant-4, 
Smith, alongside his fellow aid man Dave Johnson, set out to change the response time of 
ambulance crews in the heat of battle. Smith and Johnson noticed that it took the aid station up to 
several hours to receive a soldier after he was wounded.134 In order to remedy this, they decided 
to take steps to speed up time to treatment. Establishing themselves in a house within mortar 
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 range of the fighting, with a jeep and a radio, they maintained direct contact with the various 
company command posts, waiting for the call to pick up wounded soldiers.135 Instead of waiting 
for forward units to bring their wounded behind the line, as was standard operating procedure, 
Smith and Johnson went to the line to collect the wounded. They drove as close as possible to the 
fighting and wounded men so that litter bearers did not have to carry the injured the several miles 
back as well as carrying up to four wounded on litters and three who were able to sit within the 
jeep.136 Smith’s and Johnson’s actions allowed the forward litter bearers to stay at the front to 
help the wounded there rather than run back and forth several miles for each casualty. Medics 
like Smith who thought on their feet changed frontline treatment in ways the top brass of the 
Medical Department never imagined.  
 The conflict between the M3A2 and the jeep is one of many examples of how the combat 
zone changed medical treatment in the Second World War. As the men at the front learned and 
adapted, they were able to see what did and did not work under fire. This created a divide 
between these frontline troops and those at the top. At various points in the war, the Medical 
Department took their own steps to attempt to change how troops in the field treated their 
patients. These changes were met with stiff resistance from the medics, as they were the ones 
who understood combat and its effects on even the simplest forms of treatment.  
In an environment where transportation often determined if the wards under their care 
lived or died, many men were resistant to the changes of the Medical Department. Minoru 
Masuda was a medic attached to the 100th battalion of the 442nd Nisei Regiment. These men were 
second generation Japanese Americans who saw the fiercest fighting of the war. During the 
winter months of 1944, the Medical Department issued a memorandum that stated that to avoid 
trench foot, men should sleep with their shoes off in order to keep their feet dry.137 While writing 
to his wife, Masuda observed, “The Medical Department comes up with some crappy memo 
about GIs must not sleep with wet shoes and socks… Some of these guys higher up should come 
around once in a while instead of sitting in some soft chair giving good advice.”138 Because 
Masuda was at the front, he understood that combat could occur at any moment, so GIs left their 
boots on when they slept, always at the ready.139 The disconnect from the people at the front by 
those behind the line created many incidents of insubordination. To the medics, it seemed that 
the Medical Department had a hard time understanding what happened in the field.   
 The constant reviewing and implementation of new procedures wore on the men who had 
to carry out the new orders. Other times, meddling from the Medical Department ended up 
giving the teams out in the field more freedom to save lives. In Italy, Zachary Friedenberg was 
relieved when he received orders that authorized unorthodox treatments.140 The Medical 
Department reviewed the various treatments from its field hospitals and realized that sometimes 
the best treatments were “not necessarily giving the best functional results; function could be 
sought outside the combat zone.”141 The Medical Department began to learn from the men at the 
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 front how treatment was different from what they expected. These new procedures were all 
focused on wound care. Where in the past the Department said that irrigation of a wound was 
never permissible, now “head wounds were to be irrigated and cleaned.”142 Procedures that had 
once been thought to not be effective now turned out to be the proper way to help the wounded. 
Some of the new procedures even allowed Friedenberg to speed up a treatment: “shell fragments 
or bullets were now removed as encountered.”143 Now Friedenberg and the surgeons in the 95th 
Evacuation Hospital could quickly suture and treat wounds rather than getting caught up looking 
for each fragment. These new procedures were implemented by the Medical Department because 
those at the front had discovered that the function was not always possible in the combat zone. 
 These procedures also saved lives in ways the Medical Department never anticipated. 
The changes to procedures involving the use of casts were small, but their effects determined if a 
soldier lived or died. When Friedenberg described the new procedures, he put an emphasis on 
why the changed cast procedures made a major impact. The sealing of wounds was changed so 
that “plates, screws, or wires were to hold the bone ends together were expressly prohibited,” 
thus requiring a “cast or spica” to be applied.144 This new reliance on casts brought to light how 
dangerous a partial limb or full body cast could be. Because of the restrictive nature of casts, 
they made soldiers vulnerable under many emergency situations: “A soldier in a body cast did 
not have much chance on a sinking ship.”145 The inability of a soldier to move coupled with the 
weight of the casts made it near impossible for soldiers to escape sinking transports. It also left 
them vulnerable when aid stations came under aerial bombardment or artillery fire due to the 
possibility of being “reinjured” since they could not avoid the flying shrapnel.146 To combat the 
stationary nature of the cast, medics took precautions to ensure they could quickly move these 
immobile patients. The Medical Department adopted the procedure of having personnel “split all 
[casts] so that they could easily be removed,”147 allowing medics to quickly move them out of 
harm’s way. The men at the front had to learn how to move past what the Department deemed as 
the right thing to do and invent new methods of saving soldiers.  
 The Medical Department was in constant conflict with the men under its command. As 
they tried to improve patient care, the men at the front rapidly found flaws in the new systems 
and procedures. With every advancement made by the medics, there was an alternative 
procedure from the Department that was either rejected or resisted. It was only the procedures 
that had been tested at the front that truly affected what the medics would and would not do. If 
they felt that a treatment in any way jeopardized the fighting men, medics would either change it, 
so its impacts were minimal, or else abandon it outright, just as Masuda did. This conflict was 
not just between the men at the front and their commanders, but also with other aid men and the 
infantry. The medical troops were willing to take any steps and even issue their own orders, if 
necessary, to save their patients.  
 During combat, the troops of the Medical Department had to deal with multiple wounded 
and treat them effectively at one time. The need to address a hierarchy of care caused some 
medics and doctors to come into the same conflicts the two groups faced with the leaders of the 
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 Department. Robert Franklin came into such a conflict during a skirmish in Italy. Franklin had 
managed to pull two wounded men out of harm’s way so men from the aid station could take 
over.148 One man had suffered an eye wound and was unconscious and unresponsive; the other 
had a gunshot wound to the collarbone and was experiencing severe shock.149 Shock is defined 
as “a profound depression of all mental and physical processes usually resulting from injury and 
severe blood loss,” and can be fatal if left untreated.150 When a doctor attached to the aid station 
came to assist, he and Franklin came into conflict about the two wounded men. Franklin had 
noticed that the doctor in front of him appeared to have little training: “from what I witnessed, 
this doctor must have been rushed through medical school to supply the army.”151 The two men 
fought over experience versus rank. The young doctor had written off the shock patient as dead, 
regardless of Franklin’s claim of a pulse: “he didn’t check it; he told me I was feeling the pulse 
in my own fingertips. I was no doctor, but I knew a pulse when I felt one.”152 Franklin’s 
experience had taught him how to find even the faintest pulse, while the doctor’s training guided 
his decisions. The conflict between the two decided the fate of one wounded soldier over the 
other. A judgement call was all that was needed to determine the fate of the wounded, and when 
the two people making that call clashed, the person who suffered the most was the patient. 
  Medics would sometimes come into conflict with the men they were sworn to protect and 
who looked to them for aid. When it came to the battlefield and a soldier’s life was on the line, 
the medics had the authority do all things necessary to save the patient, even if that meant 
breaking the chain of command. Franklin learned this while he treated men during the advance 
through Sicily. As the men of his platoon were becoming more dehydrated from the heat, 
Franklin was forced into a conflict with a captain who was prohibiting him from using a well to 
refill the units’ canteens.153 When Franklin was fed up with the captain’s ignorance of the 
situation, he snapped, “Sir, I’ve got to have water for the men passing out from the heat,” and 
proceeded to fill the platoon’s canteens.154 The priority of treating the wounded men overrode 
the captain’s strict orders. It was in this moment that Franklin “realized that a medic could talk 
back to the brass and get away with it.”155 Because of their role on the battlefield, aid men and 
medics needed to have a degree of freedom, and if an order came into conflict with this, they 
simply issued their own. Other medics found this particular ability very useful, especially when 
they were tasked with treating high volumes of wounded. 
 The flow of combat made finding places to treat the wounded a priority. On a battlefield, 
the placement of various assets was important, as command posts, aid stations, and other supply 
stations needed to be in a place where they were easily accessible by the fighting men. Due to the 
importance of these battlefield assets and the lay of the land, sometimes a location would be 
contested by those who were establishing them. Robert Smith experienced such a situation when 
he desperately needed to set up an emergency aid station near St. Die, France. When a truck 
transporting men to St. Die was struck by a landmine, Smith had to find a place nearby to 
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 transport the wounded.156 Smith chose a house that was close enough to the wounded men to 
allow him and other men to quickly navigate the minefield; however, the house was being used 
as a command post.157 Smith was faced with a two choices: take the long route of navigating the 
minefield the wounded were in, or confront the officer in charge of the command post in order to 
commandeer it, turning the structure into an emergency aid station.  Smith followed the advice of 
a medic who had trained him: “someone had told me that if I needed something to save a man’s 
life, I took it, no matter the consequences.”158 The medics out on the front put their own duty 
over the strict chain of command that was the backbone of the US Army. Due to the time-
sensitive nature of saving the lives of the wounded, medics had to move quickly and take 
whatever they needed to get the job done. 
 The need to take care of the wounded at any cost prompted medics to face conflict with 
those whose authority was called into question. As seen by one of Robert Franklin’s experiences 
recounted earlier, sometimes the break in the chain of command caused soldiers to hesitate when 
a medic issued orders. While Franklin was struggling to treat the soldier suffering from a 
stomach ailment, who he would later find out was suffering from a food ailment, he was forced 
to confront two officers.159 These two men were hesitant to follow the orders of a soldier below 
them in rank. However, due to the nature of Franklin’s role on the battlefield, they had little 
option but to hand over the five gallons of water Franklin ordered them to turn over: “they eyed 
me suspiciously but reluctantly off-loaded it.”160 Even though the medic was vital to ensuring 
men survived the wounds of war, by having a unique place in the rank structure some officers 
could have seen the medic as a challenge to their own position and authority. Other officers 
understood the necessity and gravity of a medic’s orders and requests. When Robert Smith 
approached the captain in charge of the command post he needed for an aid station, he was 
surprised by the response he received: “I desperately spouted out my medical priority needs, and 
much to my surprise, the captain surrendered the house.”161 Some officers understood the 
urgency of the medic’s duty, and in doing so were quick to respond to medics’ orders.  The 
nature of war and medicine had put the medics into an area where their duty held more authority 
than rank. 
 
Conclusion 
 When the Second World War is taught and studied, there is a focus on the politics and 
battles of the conflict. When looking at the battles that were waged , the numbers of dead are 
presented as cut-and-dry statistics. Rarely are the men who fought on the battlefield to save these 
statistics ever mentioned. When the soldiers of the Medical Department are mentioned, they are 
presented in a highly romanticized light, the men who the infantry idolized, seen as the stoic 
saviors on the battlefield.  The medics and aid men have been portrayed as the calm and 
collected soldiers on the front line. This myth of the calm stoic medic has long been part of the 
story of Second World War. 
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  As the men of the Medical Department entered the war, some were lucky enough to have 
received the necessary time to train for the struggles of the combat zone. However, they quickly 
learned how ineffective their training was when engaging the enemy. The first taste of combat 
overcame some men as they were forced to deal with the aftermath of war even as it unfolded 
around them. The initial shock of combat caused some men to forget what they had learned, 
while others became casualties themselves. As the casualties mounted, men were quickly rushed 
through training programs that had previously relied heavily on the opportunity to spend 
extensive time in hospital. Others were rushed through without the most basic understanding of 
first-aid. The Medical Department was forced to send men out into combat who did not fully 
understand how to save the men under their care. 
 As these soldiers became acquainted with the struggles and tribulations of war, they 
quickly realized that in order to save as many of the wounded as possible, they would have to 
adapt to the chaos around them. They had to be able to treat, transport, and communicate all 
aspects of treatment in ways that not only were effective but kept the lives of the medics out of 
jeopardy. These necessary changes caused the men at the front to come into conflict with those at 
the top of the Department. In order to properly achieve patient care, orders were disobeyed or 
ignored. Treatments were improvised and altered from what was prescribed by men who had not 
seen what was happening in combat. Similar forms of treatment for the same ailments created 
drastically different effects, and medics out in the front found success compared to what the 
Medical Department theorized to be a valid option. This confrontation with rank was not 
confined to the Department as medics came into conflict with infantry officers who got in their 
way as they struggled to treat the wounded. 
 The image of the steadfast medic was one that did much to bolster the morale of the men 
at the front, but at what cost? By perpetuating the myth, the Medical Department left the men 
under their command with few options to perform in any other way. Men who were in the same 
harm’s way as the men they sought to protect began to suffer the same limitations. These 
limitations created an environment where myth and reality clashed. The aid men at the front were 
just as prone to losing their nerve as the infantry. They could freeze under fire. They could only 
watch the men they fought next to die for so long; they could only be subjected to so many 
rounds of artillery before abandoning the responsibilities expected of them. The medics of the 
US Army could only run into harm’s way for so long before they had to be evacuated due to 
enemy fire or a psychological wound, forcing another man to take their place.  
   Deconstructing the image of the unflappable medic adds another dimension to the study 
of the Second World War. By understanding the struggles and tribulations of the men tasked 
with saving the wounded on the battlefield, a different way of interpreting the statistics of war 
surfaces. By shifting the focus from how the various combatants maimed and killed one another 
to how they saved their soldiers, the struggles of the men tasked with saving lives has more 
gravity. The advancements that were made to save lives in order to combat the paralleled strive 
to kill have made a lasting impact. Medicine is not confined to a frozen point in time but moves 
past the conflict that drove it. The medics of the Second World War were doing more than saving 
the men of their conflict; they were also affecting those of future wars. The medic is still the 
soldier on the battlefield who every person looks to for help in their darkest moment. By 
understanding the limitations of those who serve in this capacity, the efforts made by all those 
before them can be recognized. The men who served in the Medical Department in the Second 
World War had just as important a role on the battlefield as those they fought to protect. By 
23
Del Toro: Fighting a War Without Rifles
Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2018
 keeping men alive who otherwise would have succumbed to their injuries, the medics and aid 
men developed an image that went beyond reality, an image that captures the gravity of their role 
in the war, but also an image that overshadows their own struggles in conflict. 
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